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Abstract 
Data auditing enables data owners to verify the integrity of their sensitive data stored at an untrusted cloud 
without retrieving them. This feature has been widely adopted by commercial cloud storage. However, the 
existing approaches still have some drawbacks. On the one hand, the existing schemes have a defect of fair 
arbitration, i.e., existing auditing schemes lack an effective method to punish the malicious cloud service 
provider (CSP) and compensate users whose data integrity is destroyed. On the other hand, a CSP may store 
redundant and repetitive data. These redundant data inevitably increase management overhead and 
computational cost during the whole data life cycle. To address these challenges, we propose a blockchain-
based public auditing and secure deduplication scheme with fair arbitration. By using a smart contract, our 
scheme supports automatic penalization of the malicious CSP and compensates users whose data integrity is 
damaged. Moreover, our scheme introduces a message-locked encryption algorithm and removes the random 
masking in data auditing. Compared with the existing schemes, our scheme can effectively reduce the 
computational cost of tag verification and data storage costs. We give a comprehensive analysis to 
demonstrate the correctness of the proposed scheme in terms of storage, batch auditing, and data consistency. 
Also, extensive experiments conducted on the platform of Ethereum blockchain demonstrate the efficiency 
and effectiveness of our scheme. 
 
Keywords: Blockchain, Data auditing, Fair arbitration, Data deduplication 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Cloud computing provides users with flexible computing and storage resources. It significantly 
reduces the burden of software and hardware management, which attracts many individuals and 
enterprises to outsource their confidential data to remote cloud servers. However, since users’ data is 
outsourced to the CSPs and stored on the remote cloud, it separates the ownership and management 
rights of users’ data. This makes it difficult for users to verify the integrity of their sensitive data. 
 
___________________________ 
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In the cloud computing environment, the outsourced sensitive data may be tampered and deleted, due to various hard-
ware and software vulnerabilities, and even malicious adversary attacks. For example, Google’s Europe-west1-b data center
in Belgium was affected by lightning strikes in 2015. At the height of the calamity, about 5% of the disks in the data center
experienced I/O errors. This led to the permanent loss of 100 gigabytes (GB) data in Europe-west1-b even though Google took
a series of precautions [1]. Nearly 50 million Turkish citizens’ personal information was accessed by hackers and posted
online in a downloadable 6.6 GB file in 2016 [2]. Kromtech security researchers discovered that an Amazon S3 repository
could be publicly accessed in 2017. About 316,363 PDF medical reports in this repository were leaked and more than
150,000 patients were affected by this leak [3]. Various hacking attacks and data loss problems indicate that data security
has become one of the most critical issues in cloud computing [4–10]. For ensuring the security of users’ sensitive data,
numerous data auditing schemes have been proposed [11–18]. Data auditing schemes effectively verify the data integrity
of outsourced data without downloading the original data. However, the existing schemes still have a defect of fair arbitra-
tion, i.e., data owners may not obtain the compensations even if they discover that the outsourced data has been destroyed.
Besides, with the surge in the number of cloud users, the amount of users data is exploding. According to the report from
Internet Data Center (IDC), the total amount of digital data grows at a rate that doubles every two years, which is expected to
reach 44 trillion gigabytes (GB) in 2020 [19]. Moreover, the Global Datasphere would grow from 33 ZB in 2018 to 175 ZB in
2025, from the investigation Seagate and IDC DataAge White Paper [20]. This trend makes CSPs caught in the swamp to cope
with the increasing demand for disk space and bandwidth. To solve this problem, a simple method is to ask CSPs to increase
the storage space for adapting users’ requirements for high-quality cloud storage services. Nevertheless, CSPs may store
repetitive and redundant data, which inevitably occupies a large number of backup and storage space. To address this prob-
lem, Bolosky et al. [21] proposed the idea of data deduplication, which enables CSPs to delete the repetitive data and only
keep one copy of them to decrease the bandwidth and storage space. Nowadays, a large number of CSPs have applied data
deduplication techniques, such as Google Drive [22], Memopal [23] and Dropbox [24]. Research [25] has shown that data
deduplication can reduce at least 90% of business application storage and bandwidth costs.
Although data deduplication technology brings significant benefits to CSPs, there remain some problems to be solved. It is
generally considered that CSPs are not fully trusted; they are curious about the outsourced data. Thus, a user usually
encrypts sensitive data before uploading them to the cloud. Different users choose file keys independently to encrypt the
same data and generate different ciphertexts, which hinders the realization of data deduplication. Convergent encryption
(CE) is the first realistic scheme to guarantee data confidentiality and support ciphertext deduplication [26]. In this scheme,
a user uses a convergent key to encrypt the sensitive data, where the convergent key is computed by hashing the sensitive
data. Thus, the same data can always be encrypted to the same ciphertext. This allows the CSP to perform deduplication on
ciphertexts. However, users’ data may be corrupted due to various network failures during the downloading process and
software failures during the decryption process. If the user decrypts the corrupted data, he could not obtain the correct plain-
text. Thus, the CE scheme cannot protect the data consistency of users’ sensitive data.
To address the above problems, it is fundamental to design a data auditing and secure deduplication scheme with fair
arbitration, which enables automatic data auditing without third-party auditors and consistent detection during decryption.
In should be stressed that designing a data auditing and secure deduplication scheme with fair arbitration is not a trivial
problem. First, existing data auditing schemes [11–13,15] exclusively focus on how to achieve probabilistic auditing or batch
auditing and rarely consider fair arbitration. The data owner cannot obtain the corresponding compensation once the data
integrity is destroyed, which is unfair to the data owner. Therefore, how to design a data auditing scheme with fair arbitra-
tion to punish the malicious CSP and compensate users whose data integrity is destroyed becomes an urgent problem that
needs to be solved. Second, many existing data auditing schemes resort to a third-party auditor to check the data integrity of
outsourced data and the correctness of the integrity audit results is completely dependent on the trusted third-party. How-
ever, finding a fully trusted third-party is often unrealistic. Finally, existing data auditing and data deduplication schemes
[16–18] only adopt the CE scheme to realize data deduplication. Therefore, these schemes cannot guarantee data consistency
of users’ sensitive data.
1.1. Our contribution
In this paper, we propose a blockchain-based public auditing and secure deduplication with fair arbitration. Specifically,
our scheme utilizes the blockchain technique and public-key-based homomorphic linear authenticator algorithm to realize
data auditing without any third-party auditor and automatic punishment. By integrating the Hash-and-CE-2 scheme [27],
our scheme supports data deduplication and consistent detection during decryption. In summary, our contribution can be
summarized as the following three folds:
 We propose a blockchain-based public auditing and secure deduplication scheme with fair arbitration. Different from the
previous works, our scheme supports data auditing without any third-party auditor and automatically compensates users
whose data integrity is damaged by using the smart contract. This effectively guarantees the benefits of users. In addition,
our scheme supports data deduplication, which reduces the storage and computation overhead of the CSP.
 We propose a batch data auditing and secure deduplication scheme, which can batch audit multiple auditing tasks at the
same time. Moreover, by employing an additional consistent detection mechanism, our scheme guarantees data
consistency.
410 H. Yuan et al. / Information Sciences 541 (2020) 409–425
 We provide security analysis of our scheme, and the results show that our scheme can realize the expected security goals.
Also, extensive experiments conducted on the platform of Ethereum blockchain demonstrate the efficiency and effective-
ness of our scheme.
1.2. Related work
1.2.1. Data auditing
In 2007, Ateniese et al. [11] proposed the first public audit scheme in the provable data possession (PDP) model for ver-
ifying the authenticity of data in untrusted servers. By using the homomorphic linear authenticators, users can efficiently
verify data integrity without downloading the entire data. However, this scheme cannot guarantee data privacy. The user
information will be leaked. For ensuring the retrievability of outsourced data, Juels et al. [28] proposed proof of retrievability
(PoR) in 2007. Based on the spot-checking and error-correcting codes, PoR can support data possession and retrievability at
the same time. However, this scheme does not support public auditability and the number of audit challenges is limited. In
the security model [28], Shacham and Waters [29] proposed an improved PoR scheme with proofs of security based on the
BLS signatures. To achieve public and dynamic data auditing for remote data, Wang et al. [12] proposed a data auditing
scheme, which can achieve public auditability and data dynamics at the same time. By adopting the bilinear aggregate sig-
nature, this scheme can support multiple auditing tasks simultaneously. To protect the data information of users, Wang et al.
[13] proposed a privacy-preserving public auditing scheme. This scheme enables third-party auditor (TPA) to audit multiple
tasks simultaneously. Wang et al. [15] designed a verifiable auditing scheme, which can protect the search results’ correct-
ness and completeness. To support both data integrity and data deduplication in cloud storage, Li et al. [16] proposed the
SecCloud and SecCloud + schemes. By introducing the MapReduce algorithm, SecCloud can help users to generate data tags
before uploading and auditing data integrity of outsourced data. SecCloud + enables data auditing and deduplication on
encrypted data. Liu et al. [17] proposed a message-locked integrity auditing and data deduplication scheme, which can real-
ize the deduplication of authentication tags.
1.2.2. Data deduplication
In 2002, Douceur et al. [26] proposed the first ciphertext deduplication scheme, which is called convergent encryption
(CE). In this scheme, a user uses a convergent key to encrypt sensitive data, where the convergent key is derived by hashing
the sensitive data. Since the data are the same, the different users always are able to generate the same convergent key. By
using the same convergent key, the same data can be encrypted to the same ciphertext. This allows the CSP to perform dedu-
plication on ciphertexts. However, the CE scheme cannot prevent brute-force dictionary attacks. To cope with it, the DupLESS
scheme was proposed by Bellare et al. [30]. In the DupLESS scheme, a user generates encryption keys with the help of a ded-
icated key-server by using oblivious pseudorandom functions (OPRF) protocol. The key server is configured with a system-
wide public and private key based on the RSA mechanism. Thus, the key server is able to generate message-locked encryp-
tion (MLE) key without knowing the hash value of the original data [31]. The rate-limits mechanism is also adopted in the
DupLESS scheme, which limits the query times of MLE key generation. Therefore, brute-force attacks can be efficiently
avoided. Bellare et al. [27] proposed the Hash-and-CE-2 (HCE2) scheme and added a tag checking mechanism in this scheme.
After decrypting the ciphertext, a user recomputes the tag by using the plaintext and compares it with the original tag. If the
newly generated tag is equal to the original tag, the user accepts the ciphertext; else, rejects it. To support efficient and reli-
able key management, Li et al. [32] proposed a secure data deduplication scheme based on the ramp secret sharing scheme.
Shin et al. [33] applied the predicate encryption algorithm in the deduplication scheme. However, this scheme only achieves
single-user deduplication. Based on the traceable signatures, Wang et al. [34] proposed a ciphertext deduplication scheme. In
the hybrid cloud architecture, Li et al. [35] proposed an authorized data deduplication scheme, which can support authorized
duplicate checks. Yuan et al. [36] proposed a scalable and dynamic deduplication scheme, which can support user joining
and revocation.
1.2.3. Blockchain
Bitcoin is the first and most popular decentralized cryptocurrency, which allows users online payment without a financial
institution [37]. To solve the problem of double-spending, blockchain was adopted in the bitcoin system. Blockchain is an
ever-increasing and public distributed transaction ledger, which can record an immutable history of transactions and pro-
vide a tamper-proofing ledger without any central authority. The blockchain collects data elements as a block, which con-
tains version, nonce, previous block hash, root hash of Merkle tree and timestamp. After verifying the validity, the
transaction can be recorded in the blockchain. In a blockchain, the hash value of the current transaction is used to generate
the next block. Therefore, blockchain can efficiently authenticate the history of data and resist modification of chained
blocks. To realize public verification of data deletion, Yang et al. [38] proposed a data deletion scheme based on blockchain,
which can support public verification. For the fog devices, Huang et al. [39] proposed a bitcoin-based fair payment for out-
sourcing computation. Alptekin [40] proposed an official arbitration scheme with a secure cloud storage application, which
only costs 2 ms and 80 bytes for each update on the stored data to resolve disputes. To support dynamic and public auditing
with fair arbitration, Jin et al. [41] proposed fair arbitration protocols, which can support fairness arbitration of potential
disputes.
H. Yuan et al. / Information Sciences 541 (2020) 409–425 411
To improve the function of blockchain, the smart contracts were added in the Ethereum [42]. Smart contracts are com-
puter programs running on cryptocurrency (e.g., Ethereum) blockchains, which can execute a pre-agreed program automat-
ically (such as payments and audits) and without a trusted authority. The Ethereum blockchain is described in Fig.1. We use
Tx to denote a transaction. The hash value of the current block is denoted by BlockHash, the hash value of the previous block
is denoted by PreHash, the timestamp is denoted by Timestamp, and the root value of Merkle hash tree is denoted by
RootHash. Based on the Ethereum blockchain, Zhang et al. [43] proposed a secure data provenance scheme, which improves
the security and privacy of the data provenance. In this paper, we use the Ethereum blockchain to build our scheme. Specif-
ically, we use the smart contract to charge a certain penalty of the CSP and compensate the users whose data integrity is
destroyed.
1.3. Organization
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce the preliminaries used in our scheme. We give the
system architecture and security goals of our scheme in Section 3. In Section 4, we present a detailed description of our pro-
posed scheme. The security analysis and efficient comparison are presented in Section 5. The performance evaluation results
are shown in Section 6. Finally, conclusions are made in Section 7.
2. Preliminaries
In this section, we present the definitions and properties of Hash-and-CE-2 [27] and bilinear groups.
2.1. Hash-and-convergent-encryption-2
Hash-and-CE-2 (HCE2) is one of the message-locked encryption [27]. In HCE2, a user uses a convergent key to encrypt
sensitive data, where the convergent key is derived by computing the hash of sensitive data. Thus, different users can always
generate the same convergent key for the same data. Then, the different users use the same convergent key to encrypt the
same data and get the same ciphertext. Therefore, HCE2 can realize data deduplication on the ciphertext. To protect data
consistency, an additional tag checking mechanism is adopted in the HCE2 scheme. After decrypting the ciphertext, the user
re-generates the tag of data by using the plaintext and compares it with the corresponding tag. The user accepts the data
only if the tags are consistent. We describe the Hash-and-convergent-encryption-2 (HCE2) algorithm as follows.
Definition 1. The HCE2 algorithm HCE2 = (HCE2.KeyGen, HCE2.Encrypt, HCE2.Decrypt, HCE2.TagGen) consists of the
following algorithms:
 HCE2.KeyGenðP;MiÞ ! ðKiÞ is an MLE key generation algorithm that inputs public parameter P and file Mi, and then out-
puts the MLE key Ki;
 HCE2.EncryptðKi;MiÞ ! ðCiÞ is an encryption algorithm that inputs MLE key Ki and file Mi, and then outputs Ci;
 HCE2.TagGenðCiÞ ! Ti is a tag generation algorithm that inputs ciphertext Ci and outputs the tag Ti;
 HCE2.DecryptðKi;CiÞ ! ðMiÞ is a decryption algorithm that inputs MLE key Ki and ciphertext Ci, and then outputs the
original plaintext Mi.
2.2. Bilinear groups
We review some concepts of bilinear maps, which include computability, bilinearity, non-degeneracy. Let G1;G2 and GT
be three different multiplicative cyclic groups, where the order is p. We use g1 and g2 to denote the generator of G1 and G2.
e : G1 G2 ! GT is a bilinear map with the following properties:
(1) Computability: there exits an efficiently computable algorithm for computing map e;
(2) Bilinearity: for all a 2 G1; b 2 G2 and x; y 2 Zp; eðax; byÞ ¼ eða; bÞxy;
(3) Non-degeneracy: eðg1; g2Þ – 1.
3. Model and security goals
3.1. System architecture
Based on the blockchain, we propose a public auditing and secure deduplication scheme with fair arbitration for cloud
storage. Our scheme includes two entities: users and CSP. The system model of our scheme is shown in Fig. 2.
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 Users: Users are the entities who want to upload sensitive data M to the CSP and download data later. Users encrypt the
sensitive data before outsourcing them to the CSP for avoiding privacy information leakage. After uploading the sensitive
data, users remove M for saving storage space.
 CSP: A CSP is an entity that provides storage services to users. The CSP is assumed honest-but-curious in our scheme. That
means it will honestly execute the protocol but try to extract the content and information of users’ outsourced data. The
CSP cannot obtain the plaintext information of users’ data directly by using the encryption algorithm in our scheme.
Fig. 1. Ethereum blockchain structure.
Fig. 2. The cloud storage model.
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3.2. Threat model and security goals
We consider that the CSP is the main adversary. The malicious behaviors of the adversary are described as follows. First,
the CSP may delete outsourced data that users rarely access to save storage costs for their economic interests. Thus, it is pos-
sible to obtain extra storage fees from users. Second, due to various software bugs, economically motivated hackers and
hardware faults, the outsourced data stored on the CSP may be tampered or deleted. CSP may hide the data corruption inci-
dents from users to maintain reputation.
We aim to achieve the following four security goals in this paper.
 Data privacy: We require that the CSP and malicious adversaries cannot obtain the user’s plaintext.
 Storage correctness: We require that if a CSP can pass a smart contract’s audit, it must store the entire user’s data
correctly.
 Batch auditing: We require that a smart contract can verify multiple audit tasks of users’ sensitive data at the same time.
If a CSP generates the correct response of integrity challenges, it must faithfully store all of the challenge blocks.
 Data consistency: In the cloud environment, users’ data may be corrupted due to various network failures during the
downloading process. If the user decrypts the corrupted data, he could not obtain the correct plaintext. In addition, var-
ious software failures may occur during the decryption process. Therefore, it is necessary to verify whether the decrypted
data is equal to the original data. We require that users can determine whether the decrypted data is equal to the original
plaintext.
4. Scheme construction
In this section, we first propose the main idea of our scheme. Then, we describe our scheme in detail.
4.1. Main idea
To solve the problems of data auditing without third-party auditor and integrity detection, we propose a blockchain-
based public auditing and secure deduplication scheme with fair arbitration. The main idea is that a user first encrypts
the sensitive data by using the HCE2 algorithm. Due to the intrinsic property of HCE2, users with the same data can always
generate the same encryption key. By using the same encryption key, the identical data can always be encrypted to the same
ciphertext. Then, the user uploads them to the CSP and the CSP makes a comparison between the stored data and the newly
uploaded data. If the same data is found, it means that the same data has been stored in the CSP. Then, the CSP no longer
stores the new data for saving storage space. The CSP also signs a smart contract with the user to achieve fair arbitration
without any third-party. In a smart contract, a user and the CSP take a certain amount of deposit as input, respectively. If
the CSP completely stores the user’s data, the smart contract sends the user’s deposit as an audit fee to the miner and returns
the CSP’s deposit to the CSP. If the CSP destroys the data integrity of the user’s sensitive data, the smart contract charges the
CSP’s deposit and compensates the user. When performing data integrity auditing, the user first sends an audit challenge to
the CSP. After receiving the challenge, the CSP calculates and sends a homomorphic verification tag to the smart contract
according to the user’s request. Finally, the smart contract verifies the homomorphic verification tag returned by the CSP.
The overview of our scheme is shown in Fig. 3.
4.2. A concrete scheme
Let G1;G2 and GT be three different multiplicative cyclic groups, where the order of the groups is p. We use g to denote
the generator of G2 and e : G1 G2 ! GT is a bilinear map. HðÞ is a secure hash function f0;1g ! G1. hðÞ is a secure hash
function GT ! Zp. f is a pseudorandom function: f0;1g ! n, where n denotes the total number of ciphertexts. SigðÞ is a sig-
nature algorithm. Let P be a public parameter of HCE2.
 Setup: Each user first randomly chooses a key pair ðspk; sskÞ as the private key and public key for signing, a random num-
ber x Zp and computes v  gx. Then, the user randomly chooses an element u G1. The secret parameters are
sk ¼ ðx; sskÞ. The public parameters of our scheme are pk ¼ ðv ;u; P; spk; g; eðu;vÞÞ.
 Encrypt: To upload a file F, a user first splits the file F into a set of chunks {M1;M2; . . . ;Mn}. For Mi, the user performs the
following operations.
– Execute the MLE key generation algorithm to generate MLE key Ki  HCE2:KeyGenðP;MiÞ.
– Encrypt the plaintextMi by computing Ci  HCE2:EncryptðKi;MiÞ and generate tag Ti  HCE2:TagGenðCiÞ by using the
ciphertext Ci.
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– Generate the authenticator ri  ðHðWiÞ  uCi Þx 2 G1, where Wi ¼ namejji and name 2 Zp is uniformly and randomly
chosen by the user as the identifier of file F. U ¼ frig16i6n denotes the set of authenticators.
– Generate file tag t ¼ namejjSigsskðnameÞ, where SigsskðnameÞ is the signature of file F. Then, the user sends ciphertexts
C1;C2; . . . ;Cn;U and t to the CSP 1.
After receiving the ciphertexts C1;C2; . . . ;Cn, the CSP makes a comparison between the stored data and the newly uploaded
ciphertexts. If the same ciphertext is found, it means that the same ciphertext has been stored in the CSP. Then, the CSP no
longer stores the new ciphertext for saving storage space. This efficiently reduces storage and management overhead. Mean-
time, the user signs a smart contract with the CSP. The user sends deposituser to the smart contract as his deposit and the CSP
sends depositCSP to the smart contract as its deposit. If the integrity verification is passed, the smart contract automatically
sends the user’s deposit deposituser to the miner as the audit fee and returns the deposit depositCSP to the CSP. Else, the smart
contract sends the CSP’s deposit depositCSP to the user as the penalty and sends deposituser to the miner.
 Audit: In order to audit the data integrity of the user’s outsourced data, the audit processes are described as follows.
– Based on the current blockhash, a user generates a random c-element subset I ¼ a1; a2; . . . ; ac of set ½1;n, where
ai ¼ f ðblockhashjjiÞ 2. For each element ai 2 I, the user generates a random number nai ¼ HðblockhashjjaiÞ. The metadata
chal denotes the positions of the challenge blocks. The user sends chal ¼ fðai;nai Þgai2I to the CSP.
– After receiving the challenge metadata chal ¼ fðai;nai Þgi2I , the CSP sets R ¼ eðu;vÞ 2 GT . Then, the CSP generates a linear
combination of sampled blocks l0 ¼Pai2InaiCaiand computes l ¼ hðRÞl0, where hðRÞ 2 Zp. In addition, the CSP generates
an aggregated authenticator r ¼Qai2Ir
nai
ai 2 G1. Finally, the CSP sends ft;l;r;Rg to the smart contract.
– After receiving the response of challenge ft;l;r;Rg, the smart contract executes Algorithm 1.
Fig. 3. Overview of our scheme.
1 Regarding the safety of cloud-stored data, a centralized data center will use distributed redundant data storage to protect data safety. Only in a redundant
way can the data be reliably protected upon damage. Therefore, our scheme does not deduplicate redundant copies that are used to enhance data security but
deduplicate copies that are not used for improving security.
2 It should be emphasized that the challenge value is calculated by the latest hash value of the blockchain, and the malicious adversary cannot predict the
next challenge value. Therefore, our scheme can effectively prevent man-in-the-middle attacks and replay attacks.
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Algorithm1 Auditing of smart contract.
Require: The file tag t and responses of challenge fl;r;Rg;
Ensure: Result of integrity audit t;
1: Verify the signature SigsskðnameÞ via spk. If the verification fails, let t ¼ 0 and break;
2: Compute z ¼ hðRÞ;
3: Compute a ¼ eðrz; gÞ and b ¼ eððQai2IHðWai Þ
nai Þz  ul;vÞ;
4: if a ¼ b
5: Send deposituser to the miner and send depositCSP to the CSP;
6: Set t ¼ 1;
7: else
8: Send depositCSP to the user and send deposituser to the miner;
9: Set t ¼ 0;
10: end if
11: return t.
The correctness of a ¼ b is elaborated as follows:
a ¼ eðrz; gÞ ¼ eððð
Y
ai2I
HðWai Þ  uCai Þ
xnai Þz; gÞ
¼ eððð
Y
ai2I
HðWai Þnai  unai Cai Þ
z
; gÞx
¼ eðð
Y
ai2I
HðWai Þnai Þ
z  ul0z;vÞ
¼ eðð
Y
ai2I
HðWai Þnai Þ
z  ul;vÞ
 Decrypt: After downloading the ciphertext C1;C2; . . . ; Cn, the user performs the following operations.
– Input the ciphertext Ci into tag generation algorithm and generate the tag Ti  HCE2:TagGenðCiÞ.
– Input the key Ki and plaintext Ci into the decryption algorithm and get the plaintext Mi  HCE2:DecryptðKi;CiÞ.
– Generate the tag T0i by using Mi and compare it with Ti. If T0i ¼ Ti, the user accepts plaintext Mi; else, rejects it.
4.3. Batch auditing
To improve the efficiency of data auditing, our scheme supports batch data auditing. In the batch auditing scheme, we
aggregate the data authenticators of multiple data into one data authenticator. As a result, our scheme can audit multiple
tasks at the same time. The batch auditing scheme is described as follows.
 Setup: The setup phase is the same as the above auditing scheme, so we omit here.
 Encrypt: To upload files F ¼ F1; F2; . . . ; Fs, a user first splits each file Fdð1 6 d 6 sÞ into a set of chunks
{Md1;M
d
2; . . . ;M
d
n}ð1 6 d 6 sÞ 3. For Mdi , the user performs the following operations.
– Execute Kdi  HCE2:KeyGenðP;Mdi Þ to generate the convergent key Kdi .
– Encrypt the plaintext Mdi by computing C
d
i  HCE2:EncryptðKdi ;Mdi Þ and generate tag Tdi  HCE2:TagGenðCdi Þ by using
the ciphertext Cdi .
– Generate the authenticator rdi  ðHðWdi Þ  uC
d
i Þx, where Wdi ¼ namedjji and named is uniformly and randomly chosen by
the user from Zp as the identifier of file Fd. We use Ud ¼ frdi g16i6nto denote the set of authenticators.
– Use key ssk to generate file tag td ¼ namedjjSigsskðnamedÞ, where SigsskðnamedÞ is the signature of the file Fd. Then, the
user sends ciphertexts Cd ¼ fCd1;Cd2; . . . ;Cdng and verification metadata Ud; td to the CSP.
3 We assume that each file Fd has the same number of block n in our scheme.
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After receiving the ciphertext C1;C2; . . . ;Cs, the CSP signs a smart contract with the user. The user sends deposituser to the
smart contract as his deposit and the CSP sends depositCSP to the smart contract as its deposit. If the integrity verification is
passed, the smart contract sends the user’s deposit deposituser to the miner as the audit fee and returns depositCSP to the CSP.
Else, the smart contract sends the CSP’s deposit depositCSP to the user as the penalty and sends deposituser to the miner.
Algorithm2 Batch auditing of smart contract.
Require: The file tag t1; t2; . . . ; ts and responses of challenge fl1;l2; . . . ;ls;r1;r2; . . . ;rs;Rg;
Ensure: Result of integrity audit t;
1: Verify each signature SigsskðnamedÞð1 6 d 6 sÞ via spk. If any verification fails, let t ¼ 0 and break;
2: Compute z ¼ hðRÞ;
3: Compute a ¼ eðQsd¼1rzd; gÞ ;
4: Compute b ¼Qsd¼1eðð
Q
ai2IHðW
d
ai
Þnai Þz  uld ;vÞ;
5: if a ¼ b
6: Send deposituser to the miner and send depositCSP to the CSP;
7: Set t ¼ 1;
8: else
9: Send depositCSP to the user and send deposituser to the miner;
10: Set t ¼ 0;
11: end if
12: return t.
 Audit: In order to audit the data integrity of the user’s outsourced data, the audit processes are described as follows.
– Based on the current blockhash, a user generates a random c-element subset I ¼ a1; a2; . . . ; ac of set ½1;n, where
ai ¼ f ðblockhashjjiÞ. For each element ai 2 I, the user generates a random number nai ¼ HðblockhashjjaiÞ. The metadata
chal specifies the positions of the challenge blocks. The user sends chal ¼ fðai; nai Þgai2I to the CSP.
– After receiving the metadata of challenge chal ¼ fðai; nai Þgi2I , the CSP sets R ¼ eðu;vÞ 2 GT . For each Cdð1 6 d 6 sÞ, the
CSP generates a linear combination of sampled blocks l0d ¼
P
ai2InaiC
d
ai
and computes ld ¼ hðRÞl0d, where hðRÞ 2 Zp. In
addition, the CSP generates an aggregated authenticator rd ¼
Q
ai2Iðrdai Þ
nai 2 G1. Finally, the CSP sends
fl1;l2; . . . ;ls;r1;r2; . . . ;rs;Rg to the smart contract.
– After receiving the response of challenge ft1; t2; . . . ; ts;l1;l2; . . . ;ls;r1;r2; . . . ;rs;Rg, the smart contract executes Algo-
rithm 2.
5. Analysis of our proposed scheme
5.1. Security Analysis
In this subsection, we give a comprehensive analysis to demonstrate the security of the proposed scheme in terms of data
privacy, storage correctness, batch auditing and data consistency. We assume that the underlying basic tools are secure,
which include homomorphic linear authenticator, one-way hash function, Hash-and-CE-2 scheme and symmetric encryp-
tion scheme. These assumptions ensure the security of our scheme. During the data uploading phase, users use a symmetric
encryption algorithm (such as AES-256) to encrypt the data and upload it to the CSP. Therefore, the data privacy of out-
sourcing data can be protected.
5.1.1. Storage correctness
We prove that the CSP cannot generate valid proof of challenge without honest storing the entire original data as follows.
Theorem 5.1. Assume that the computational Diffie-Hellman problem is hard in bilinear groups and the digital signature scheme
is existentially unforgeable, in random oracle model, unless the adversary correctly generates the proof ðt;l;r;RÞ by using
challenge chal and ciphertext C, the probability that the auditor accepts this proof is negligible.
Proof 1. In random oracle model, we assume that there exists an extractor l0. With the valid signature r and l0, our theorem
follows the previous schemes [13,29].
The extractor can control the random oracle hðÞ. Then, the extractor is able to answer the hash query issued by the CSP.
We assume that the extractor is an adversary. To response a challenge z ¼ HðRÞ of the extractor, the CSP outputs fr;l;Rg
such that the following equation is satisfied:
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eðrz; gÞ ¼ eðð
Y
ai2I
HðWai Þnai Þ
z  ul;vÞ: ð1Þ
Assume that the extractor can reverse a CSP in the execution of the protocol to the point just before the challenge hðRÞ is
given. Then, the extractor can set hðRÞ to be z – z. The CSP returns fr;l;Rg such that:
eðrz ; gÞ ¼ eðð
Y
ai2I
HðWai Þnai Þ
z  ul ; vÞ: ð2Þ
Recalled that ri  ðHðWiÞ  uCi Þx. We divide (1) by (2):
eðrzz ; gÞ ¼ eðð
Y
ai2I
HðWai Þnai Þ
zz  ull ; vÞ
eðrzz ; gÞ ¼ eðð
Y
ai2I
HðWai Þnai Þ
zz
; gxÞeðull ; gxÞ
rzz ¼ ð
Y
ai2I
HðWai Þnai Þ
xðzzÞ  uxðllÞ
ð
Y
ai2I
rnaiai Þ
zz ¼ ð
Y
ai2I
HðWai Þnai Þ
xðzzÞ  uxðllÞ
uxðll
Þ ¼ ð
Y
ai2I
ðrai=HðWai ÞxÞ
nai Þzz

uxðll
Þ ¼ ð
Y
ai2I
ðuxCai Þnai Þzz

l l ¼ ð
X
ai2I
Cai nai Þ  ðz zÞ
X
ai2I
Cai nai ¼ ðl lÞ=ðz zÞ:
Finally, the extractor can obtain fr;l0 ¼ ðl lÞ=z zg as a valid response of basic proofs of retrievability scheme [29]. h
Theorem 5.2. The proposed scheme guarantees correctness of batch auditing.
Proof 2. The batch auditing involves s challenges. The correctness of batch auditing is proved as follows:
a ¼ eð
Ys
d¼1
rzd; gÞ ¼ eð
Ys
d¼1
ðð
Y
ai2I
HðWdai Þ  u
Cdai Þ
xnai Þ
z
; gÞ
¼ eð
Ys
d¼1
ðð
Y
ai2I
HðWdai Þ
nai  unai Cdai Þ
z
; gÞ
x
¼ eð
Ys
d¼1
ð
Y
ai2I
HðWdai Þ
nai z  ul0dzÞ;vÞ
¼ eð
Ys
d¼1
ð
Y
ai2I
HðWdai Þ
nai z  uld Þ; vÞ
¼
Ys
d¼1
eð
Y
ai2I
HðWdai Þ
nai z  uld ;vÞ
Therefore, our scheme can guarantee the correctness of batch auditing. h
Finally, we analyze the data consistency of the proposed scheme. In downloading and decryption processes, a user’s data
may be corrupted by various network and software failures. To verify the correctness of decrypted data, our scheme adopts a
consistent detection mechanism. After downloading the ciphertext C ¼ C1jjT from the CSP, the user u first generates the tag T
by using the ciphertext C ¼ C1jjT. Then, the user decrypts the ciphertext C1 and generates the plaintext M0 by using the file
418 H. Yuan et al. / Information Sciences 541 (2020) 409–425
key K. Finally, the user re-generates tag T0 by using the plaintext M0. After generating the tag T and T0, the user u checks
whether T0 ¼ T . If T0 ¼ T , the user u accepts the message. Otherwise, the user drops the message. Therefore, our scheme guar-
antees data consistency.
5.2. Comparison
Table 1 presents the comparison among four data auditing schemes, which consists of the provable data possession (PDP)
scheme [11], Wang et al.’s scheme [13], Li et al.’s scheme [16] and our scheme, in terms of probabilistic audit, batch auditing,
privacy-preserving, data deduplication, and fair arbitration.
All the data auditing schemes support probabilistic audit and batch auditing, which can reduce the computing and man-
agement overhead of the CSP and users. PDP cannot guarantee the privacy-preserving so that the sensitive information of
users’ data will be leaked. By using homomorphic linear authenticator and random masking, Wang et al.’s scheme [13]
can prevent TPA from learning any information of the users’ sensitive data stored on the CSP during the data auditing. By
combining data deduplication with data auditing, Li et al.’s [16] scheme and our scheme allow users to encrypt the sensitive
data before they upload the sensitive data to the CSP. Therefore, Li et al.’s scheme and our scheme also protect the privacy
information of outsourced data.
Li et al.’s scheme uses the convergence encryption scheme to achieve data deduplication. Thus, this scheme cannot pro-
tect data consistency. In our scheme, we use the HCE2 algorithm to achieve data deduplication. In the HCE2 scheme, an addi-
tional tag checking mechanism is adopted, which can effectively discover whether the decrypted data is equal to the original
plaintext. Besides, the previous schemes do not consider the problem of fair arbitration. After finding that the CSP has
destroyed the users’ sensitive data, the users still cannot effectively obtain corresponding compensation, which is extremely
unfair to the users. To solve this problem, we apply a smart contract in our scheme, which can automatically execute data
auditing without relying on the TPA. Moreover, when data integrity is compromised, our scheme can punish malicious CSP
and compensate users whose data integrity is destroyed. Therefore, our scheme can realize fair arbitration.
Table 2 presents the computational cost of Wang et al.’s scheme [13] and our scheme. Bil denotes the operation of the
bilinear map. Mul denotes the operation of multiplication. Add denotes the operation of addition. Exp denotes the exponent
operation. n denotes the number of data blocks being challenged and k denotes the number of auditing tasks during the
phase of batch auditing. In the phase of proof generation, our scheme reduces one exponent operation and one additional
operation compared with Wang et al.’s scheme. In the phase of batch proof generation, our scheme reduces k addition oper-
ations and one exponent operation compared with Wang et al.’s scheme. In the phase of integrity verification and batch ver-
ification, our scheme reduces one multiplication operation compared with Wang et al.’s scheme. The results of the
comparison show that our scheme has less computational cost than Wang et al.’s scheme.
6. Performance evaluation
In this section, we provide a thorough experimental evaluation of our scheme. We implement our scheme in the Java pro-
gramming language by using the JPBC library v2.0.0 and Solidity v0.5.1. The test environment is Intel(R) Core(TM) i7-7820HK
CPU 2.90 GHz 16.0 GB RAM, Windows 10. We test the solidity program in the Remix-IDE [44]. To verify the performance of
our scheme and compare it with the Wang et al.’s scheme [13] and Li et al.’s scheme [16], we mainly use the MLE key
generation time, proof generation time, batch proof generation time, gas cost of integrity verification and gas cost of batch
verification as the evaluation metrics. Proof generation time and batch proof generation time are the time that the CSP uses
Table 1
Comparison of Data Auditing Schemes.
Scheme PDP [11] Wang et al. [13] Li et al. [16] Our scheme
Probabilistic audit U U U U
Batch auditing U U U U
Privacy-preserving  U U U
Data deduplication   U U
Fair arbitration    U
Table 2
Computational Cost of Data Auditing Schemes.
Scheme Wang et al. [13] Our scheme
Proof generation Bil + (n + 1) Exp + 2nMul + nAdd Bil + nExp + 2nMul + (n  1) Add
Batch proof generation k(2nMul + nAdd + nExp)+Bil + Exp k(2nMul+(n  1) Add + nExp)+Bil
Integrity verification 2Bil+(n + 3) Exp+(n + 1) Mul 2Bil+(n + 3) Exp + nMul
Batch verification (k + 1) Bil+(kn + 2 k  1) Mul+(n + 3) kExp (k + 1) Bil+(kn + 2 k  2) Mul+(n + 3) kExp
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to generate proof of integrity audit and generate batch proof of integrity audit. Gas cost of integrity verification and batch
verification are the cost that the smart contract uses to verify the integrity and verify the result of batch verification. Accord-
ing to [13,16], we set the number of challenge blocks to 300 and 460. The data size ranges from 1 MB to 10 MB. The results of
performance evaluation are the average of 20 experiments. The test time does not include the communication time between
the user and the CSP.
6.1. MLE key generation performance
We first measure the performance of the MLE key generation of our scheme and Li et al.’s scheme [16]. To test the con-
vergent key generation time, we use the SHA-128 and SHA-256 as the hash functions, where the data size from 1 MB to
10 MB. We set the size of the block to 1 KB and generate an encryption key for each block. The detail of the key generation
time is shown in Fig. 4. The results show that the MLE key generation time of our scheme is almost the same as Li et al.’s
scheme.
6.2. Encryption and decryption performance
Different from the existing data auditing schemes [11–13,15], our scheme generates a homomorphic linear authenticator
of the outsourced data on the ciphertext. Although our scheme introduces encryption and decryption time, our scheme can
Fig. 4. MLE key generation time.
Fig. 5. Encryption and decryption time.
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support data deduplication and prevent the auditor from learning any knowledge about the users’ sensitive data. To test the
encryption and decryption time, we use the AES-128 and AES-256 algorithms in our scheme, where the data size from 1 MB
to 8 MB. The cost of encryption and decryption time is shown in Fig. 5.
6.3. Upload performance
To evaluate the effect of data deduplication, we test the data uploading time of our scheme andWang et al.’s scheme [13].
We set the data size and the key size to 1 MB and 128-bit, respectively. The data uploading time includes MLE key generation
time, data encryption time and tag generation time. The evaluation results are shown in Fig. 6. The results show that the data
uploading time in our scheme is almost the same as Wang et al.’s scheme.
Our scheme focuses on achieving data auditing without any third-party and fair arbitration, yet we observe the problems
of user revocation. To achieve dynamic user management, we can introduce an access control algorithm or CP-ABE method
to further improve the flexibility of our scheme. We pose this problem as future work.
Fig. 6. Data uploading time.
Fig. 7. Proof generation time.
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6.4. Proof generation and batch proof generation performance
We measure the proof generation and batch proof generation time of our scheme and Wang et al.’s scheme [13]. Since
both our scheme and Wang et al.’s scheme use a probabilistic integrity audit algorithm, the proof generation time for these
two schemes is constant. Since our scheme does not require a randommasking method to achieve privacy-preserving public
auditing, the proof generation and batch proof generation time of our scheme is shorter than Wang et al.’s scheme. The eval-
uation results are shown in Fig. 7.
To improve the efficiency of data auditing, our scheme and Wang et al.’s scheme support batch proof generation. To test
the performance of batch proof generation, we set the data size to 10 MB. The batch auditing time is shown in Fig. 8.
6.5. Gas cost of integrity verification and batch verification
To achieve fair arbitration, we use the smart contract to verify the audit results of outsourced data automatically. To test
the cost of verifying, we use the solidity to program the smart contract and experiment on the Ethereum blockchain. We
measure the gas cost of integrity verification and batch verification of our scheme and Wang et al.’s scheme [13]. Since
our scheme does not require a random masking method to support privacy-preserving public auditing, the gas cost of our
scheme is less thanWang et al.’s scheme. The evaluation results of the gas cost of integrity verification and batch verification
Fig. 8. Batch proof generation time.
Fig. 9. Gas cost of integrity verification.
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are shown in Fig. 9 and Fig. 10. It can be known from Fig. 9 that when the number of randomly selected data blocks is con-
stant, the overhead of the miner to verify the data integrity of the outsourcing data does not increase with the increase of the
data size. The consumed gas value is 1:33 107 Gwei (0.013 Ether) when verifying 300 randomly selected data blocks, and
the consumed gas value is 2:01 107 Gwei (0.020Ether) when verifying 460 randomly selected data blocks.
6.6. Probabilistic audit performance
As previous work [11,13] showed that if t percent of the total data is corrupted by the CSP and every challenge block for
auditing is chosen uniformly, then random sampling c blocks can realize the detection probability Px ¼ 1 ð1 tÞc , where
the number of the challenged data blocks is denoted by c and the total number of data blocks is denoted by n. In Fig. 11
and Fig. 12, we show Px as a function of n and c for two values of t. If t ¼ 1% of the total number of block n, then the data
auditing can achieve at least 95% and 99% probability to find the misbehavior by asking 300 blocks and 460 blocks, respec-
tively. If the sampling strategies are rational, our scheme can realize efficient data auditing and communication overhead can
be reduced.
Fig. 10. Gas cost of batch verification.
Fig. 11. t ¼ 1% of n.
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7. Conclusion
In this paper, we propose a blockchain-based public auditing and secure deduplication scheme with fair arbitration. By
employing a homomorphic linear authenticator and smart contract, our scheme supports data auditing without relying on
any third-party auditor. Besides, when the users’ data integrity is compromised, our scheme can automatically punish the
malicious CSP and compensate users whose data integrity is destroyed. In addition, our scheme supports data deduplication
on encrypted data, which reduces the storage overhead and management cost of the CSP. We also prove that our scheme can
achieve the desired security goals and provide detailed experimental results. The performance analysis shows that our
scheme is efficient. In future work, we plan to address the problem of dynamic user management and evaluate how our
scheme performs for other storage workloads.
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